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Must	  Understanding	  Be	  Coherent?	  
Abstract:	  Several	  authors	  suggest	  that	  understanding	  and	  epistemic	  coherence	  are	  tightly	  connected.	  Using	  an	  account	  of	  understanding	  that	  makes	  no	  appeal	  to	  coherence,	  I	  explain	  away	  the	  intuitions	  that	  motivate	  this	  position.	  I	  then	  show	  that	  the	  leading	  coherentist	  epistemologies	  only	  place	  plausible	  constraints	  on	  understanding	  insofar	  as	  they	  replicate	  my	  own	  account’s	  requirements.	  I	  conclude	  that	  understanding	  is	  only	  superficially	  coherent.	  	  Kareem	  Khalifa	  Department	  of	  Philosophy	  Middlebury	  College	  	  A	  necessary	  feature	  of	  understanding—or	  so	  it	  would	  seem—is	  that	  one	  grasps	  how	  various	  propositions	  within	  a	  common	  domain	  hang	  together.	  Newton	  provided	  us	  with	  a	  unified	  understanding	  of	  the	  motion	  of	  the	  planets,	  the	  ebb	  and	  flow	  of	  the	  tides,	  and	  the	  antics	  of	  cannonballs,	  apples,	  and	  other	  terrestrial	  objects.	  A	  good	  sleuth	  spins	  together	  disparate	  clues	  about	  a	  suspect’s	  motives,	  means,	  and	  opportunity	  to	  understand	  how	  a	  crime	  unfolded.	  A	  doctor	  triangulates	  between	  a	  battery	  of	  tests	  and	  a	  variety	  of	  symptoms	  to	  understand	  her	  patient’s	  maladies.	  	   But	  what	  epistemological	  traction	  can	  we	  get	  from	  figurative	  talk	  that	  things	  “hang	  together”	  when	  we	  understand?	  A	  natural	  idea	  is	  that	  understanding	  bears	  a	  deep	  connection	  with	  coherence	  theories	  of	  justification—as	  several	  epistemologists	  have	  suggested	  (Carter	  and	  Gordon	  2014;	  Elgin	  2004,	  2006,	  2007;	  Kvanvig	  2003,	  2009;	  Riggs	  2009).	  Elgin	  and	  Kvanvig	  provide	  two	  of	  the	  clearest	  statements:	  	   [An	  individual]	  proposition	  derives	  its	  epistemological	  status	  from	  a	  suitably	  unified,	  integrated,	  coherent	  body	  of	  information.	  This	  is	  the	  core	  conception	  
of	  understanding	  […]	  And	  it	  is	  the	  conception	  of	  understanding	  that	  is	  closely	  connected	  to	  explanation.	  (Elgin	  2007,	  34;	  emphasis	  added)	  	  The	  central	  feature	  of	  understanding,	  it	  seems	  to	  me,	  is	  in	  the	  neighborhood	  of	  what	  internalist	  coherence	  theories	  say	  about	  justification.	  Understanding	  requires	  the	  grasping	  of	  explanatory	  and	  other	  coherence-­‐making	  relationships	  in	  a	  large	  and	  comprehensive	  body	  of	  information.	  (Kvanvig	  2003,	  192;	  emphasis	  added)1	  	  Against	  these	  views,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  understanding’s	  connection	  with	  coherence	  is	  shallow,	  floating	  innocuously	  atop	  sturdier	  depths.	  In	  other	  words,	  coherence	  is	  not	  part	  of	  the	  “core	  conception	  of	  understanding.”	  Similarly,	  while	  the	  “central	  feature	  of	  understanding”	  is	  in	  the	  neighborhood	  of	  coherence,	  it	  isn’t	  at	  home	  there.	  On	  my	  view,	  understanding	  is	  quasi-­‐coherent:	  it	  walks	  like	  coherence	  and	  talks	  like	  coherence,	  but	  does	  not	  require	  a	  coherentist	  epistemology.	  
Specifically,	  I	  will	  first	  present	  the	  defining	  features	  of	  coherentism	  about	  understanding	  (§1).	  Then	  I	  will	  offer	  my	  alternative	  account	  of	  understanding	  that	  makes	  no	  appeal	  to	  coherence	  (§2).	  After	  that,	  I	  argue	  that	  my	  own	  view	  undercuts	  the	  best	  arguments	  for	  coherentism	  about	  understanding	  (§3),	  and	  conclude	  by	  showing	  that	  attempts	  to	  saddle	  understanding	  with	  robust	  coherence	  requirements	  deliver	  implausible	  results	  (§4).	  
1. Coherentism	  about	  understanding	  I	  will	  be	  critiquing	  the	  following	  coherentist	  thesis	  about	  understanding:	  	   (CU)	   Ceteris	  paribus,	  if	  both	  S1	  and	  S2	  have	  the	  true	  belief	  that	  q	  explains	  p	  but	  S1’s	  belief	  that	  q	  explains	  p	  plays	  a	  more	  central	  role	  in	  a	  more	  coherent	  belief	  system	  than	  S2’s,	  then	  S1	  better	  understands	  why	  p	  than	  S2.	  	  CU	  is	  modest	  on	  two	  fronts.	  First,	  it’s	  a	  claim	  about	  how	  understanding	  improves.	  By	  contrast,	  a	  categorical	  statement	  that	  all	  understanding	  requires	  coherence	  might	  be	  refuted	  by	  relatively	  unimpressive	  instances	  of	  understanding.	  Second,	  it	  doesn’t	  claim	  that	  understanding	  improves	  only	  via	  coherence.	  Hence,	  I’m	  not	  demanding	  too	  much	  of	  coherentists.	  Despite	  CU’s	  modesty,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  dispensable.	  	  In	  another	  sense,	  however,	  CU	  is	  slightly	  immodest—or	  at	  least	  unorthodox.	  Often,	  coherentism	  about	  understanding	  is	  driven	  not	  by	  understanding	  why	  something	  is	  the	  case,	  but	  by	  so-­‐called	  objectual	  understanding,	  i.e.	  the	  understanding	  we	  have	  of	  a	  subject	  matter.	  For	  reasons	  I	  rehearse	  elsewhere	  (Khalifa	  2013),	  I	  will	  be	  assuming	  objectual	  understanding	  is	  reducible	  to	  understanding-­‐why.	  Even	  if	  this	  assumption	  were	  relaxed,	  I	  suspect	  that	  many	  of	  my	  arguments	  would,	  with	  slight	  modification,	  still	  pose	  problems	  for	  “objectualist”	  variations	  of	  CU.	  	   More	  of	  CU—specifically,	  what’s	  meant	  by	  “a	  more	  coherent	  system”—will	  be	  discussed	  below.	  For	  now,	  I’ll	  rest	  on	  general	  intuitions.	  A	  belief	  plays	  a	  more	  central	  role	  in	  a	  belief	  system	  when	  it	  plays	  important	  inferential	  and	  explanatory	  roles	  in	  that	  system.	  One	  belief	  system	  B1	  is	  more	  coherent	  than	  another	  belief	  system	  B2	  when	  B1	  scores	  better	  with	  respect	  to	  its	  theoretical	  virtues	  and	  the	  quantity	  and	  quality	  of	  its	  members’	  inferential	  relations.	  More	  metaphorically:	  the	  denser	  one’s	  web	  of	  beliefs,	  the	  more	  coherent	  one’s	  belief	  system.	  	   I	  haven’t	  found	  an	  explicit	  argument	  for	  CU,	  nor	  any	  other	  coherentist	  accounts	  of	  understanding.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  following	  strikes	  me	  as	  capturing	  the	  spirit	  of	  Elgin	  and	  Kvanvig’s	  remarks:	  	   (1) Ceteris	  paribus,	  if	  S1	  grasps	  more	  connections	  between	  p	  and	  other	  relevant	  propositions	  than	  S2,	  then	  S1	  better	  understands	  why	  p	  than	  S2.	  	  (2) Coherentism	  about	  understanding	  (i.e.	  CU)	  best	  explains	  this	  fact.	  [probably]	  (3) Coherentism	  about	  understanding	  is	  true.	  	  
Call	  this	  the	  Connection	  Argument.	  I’ll	  grant	  the	  first	  premise.	  The	  coherentist	  then	  asserts	  that	  no	  other	  epistemology	  could	  account	  for	  this	  platitude	  about	  understanding	  better	  than	  coherentism.	  Roughly,	  the	  thought	  is	  that	  any	  other	  epistemology	  will	  have	  to	  “write	  in”	  ad	  hoc	  the	  dense	  web	  of	  connections	  that	  falls	  out	  of	  coherentism	  without	  artifice.	  
2. Understanding	  as	  scientific	  knowledge	  I’ll	  challenge	  the	  second	  premise	  of	  the	  Connection	  Argument,	  arguing	  that	  coherentists	  err	  by	  having	  too	  narrow	  a	  view	  of	  the	  alternative	  epistemologies	  that	  could	  explain	  the	  intimate	  link	  between	  understanding	  and	  grasping	  sundry	  connections.	  Specifically,	  I’ll	  suggest	  that	  the	  following	  “scientific	  knowledge”	  approach	  to	  understanding	  provides	  a	  better	  explanation	  of	  the	  relevant	  features	  of	  understanding:	  	   (SKU)	  	  Ceteris	  paribus,	  if	  both	  S1	  and	  S2	  have	  the	  true	  belief	  that	  q	  explains	  p	  but	  S1’s	  belief	  that	  q	  explains	  p	  more	  closely	  resembles	  scientific	  knowledge	  than	  S2’s,	  then	  S1	  better	  understands	  why	  p	  than	  S2.	  	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  clarify	  SKU	  (§2.1)	  and	  then	  motivate	  it	  with	  an	  example	  (§2.2).	  In	  the	  next,	  I	  compare	  it	  with	  CU.	  	  
2.1. A	  ‘Science-­‐First’	  Epistemology	  of	  Understanding	  Let	  me	  offer	  two	  meta-­‐epistemological	  scruples	  that	  inform	  my	  approach	  to	  understanding.	  First,	  I	  don’t	  think	  that	  a	  full-­‐blown	  conceptual	  analysis	  of	  knowledge	  is	  required	  to	  answer	  the	  pressing	  philosophical	  questions	  about	  understanding.	  The	  only	  traditional	  epistemological	  theses	  that	  my	  view	  requires	  are	  that:	  (a)	  scientific	  knowledge	  requires	  true	  belief	  that	  could	  not	  easily	  have	  been	  false	  and	  (b)	  scientific	  knowledge	  is	  compatible	  with	  foundationalism.	  Second,	  I	  hold	  that	  descriptions	  of	  scientific	  practice	  are	  rich	  enough	  to	  give	  us	  anything	  else	  we	  could	  want	  from	  the	  epistemology	  of	  understanding.2	  Specifically,	  by	  scientific	  knowledge,	  I	  mean	  knowledge	  gained	  through	  the	  best	  methods	  and	  evidence	  characteristic	  of	  the	  natural	  and	  social	  sciences	  as	  we	  currently	  find	  them.	  I	  am	  a	  scientific	  pluralist,	  and	  am	  thus	  skeptical	  that	  a	  single	  kind	  of	  explanation,	  methodology,	  evidence,	  or	  inference	  applies	  to	  every	  instance	  of	  scientific	  knowledge.	  Nevertheless,	  I	  will	  now	  present	  some	  very	  general	  methods	  that	  apply	  to	  many	  scientific	  inquiries	  involving	  explanations.	  As	  I	  see	  it,	  scientific	  knowledge	  of	  an	  explanation	  typically	  has	  three	  features:	  consideration,	  comparison,	  and	  belief-­‐formation.3	  First,	  scientists	  typically	  can	  consider	  many	  of	  the	  plausible	  potential	  explanations	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  interest.	  Sometimes,	  consideration	  requires	  generating	  new	  hypotheses	  from	  scratch,	  or	  (more	  commonly)	  it	  only	  involves	  countenancing	  explanations	  that	  have	  been	  generated	  by	  others.	  Second,	  scientists	  typically	  can	  compare	  the	  potential	  explanations	  that	  they	  have	  considered.	  Here,	  they	  cite	  scientific	  evidence	  (and	  perhaps	  other,	  non-­‐evidential	  scientific	  factors)	  that	  favors	  some	  explanations	  over	  others.	  In	  paradigmatic	  cases,	  one	  explanation	  is	  the	  “winner”	  of	  these	  comparisons,	  though	  
sometimes	  multiple	  explanations	  are	  good	  along	  different	  dimensions.	  Finally	  scientists	  form	  doxastic	  attitudes	  based	  on	  the	  comparisons	  just	  discussed.	  Scientists	  believe	  that	  clear	  winners	  in	  the	  prior	  stage	  of	  comparison	  are	  true,	  disbelieve	  clear	  losers,	  and	  assign	  appropriate	  degrees	  of	  belief	  about	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  pack.	  For	  ease	  of	  reference,	  I’ll	  call	  this	  tripartite	  structure	  scientific	  explanatory	  evaluation.4	  Earlier,	  I	  mentioned	  that	  I	  take	  scientific	  knowledge	  to	  require	  true	  belief	  that	  could	  not	  easily	  have	  been	  false.	  In	  other	  words,	  scientific	  knowledge	  requires	  safe	  belief.	  Following	  Pritchard,	  I	  define	  safety	  thusly:	  	  
S’s	  belief	  is	  safe	  iff	  in	  most	  near-­‐by	  possible	  worlds	  in	  which	  S	  continues	  to	  form	  her	  belief	  about	  the	  target	  proposition	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  in	  the	  actual	  world,	  and	  in	  all	  very	  close	  near-­‐by	  possible	  worlds	  in	  which	  S	  continues	  to	  form	  her	  belief	  about	  the	  target	  proposition	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  the	  actual	  world,	  her	  belief	  continues	  to	  be	  true.	  (Pritchard	  2009,	  34)	  	  	  Our	  description	  of	  scientific	  explanatory	  evaluation	  clarifies	  how	  S	  “continues	  to	  form	  her	  belief	  about	  the	  target	  proposition	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  in	  the	  actual	  world.”	  In	  the	  present	  context,	  this	  means	  that	  in	  the	  relevant	  possible	  worlds,	  S	  continues	  to	  believe	  that	  q	  explains	  p	  by:	  	  
• considering	  the	  same	  class	  of	  potential	  explanations	  of	  p	  as	  she	  did	  in	  the	  actual	  world,	  and	  	  
• ranking	  those	  explanations	  in	  the	  same	  way	  and	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  same	  evidence	  as	  she	  does	  in	  the	  actual	  world.	  	  Finally,	  a	  good	  deal	  more	  should	  be	  said	  about	  how	  SKU	  parses	  degrees	  of	  understanding.	  However,	  these	  complications	  won’t	  figure	  in	  what	  follows,	  so	  I’ll	  save	  that	  for	  another	  day.	  
2.2. The	  Case	  of	  Peptic	  Ulcers	  Let’s	  now	  see	  how	  SKU	  works	  with	  a	  real	  scientific	  example:	  our	  current	  understanding	  of	  peptic	  ulcers.	  The	  example	  suggests	  itself	  for	  two	  reasons.	  First,	  it’s	  an	  example	  replete	  with	  many	  details	  that	  could	  constrain	  any	  analysis	  of	  understanding.	  Second,	  it	  has	  been	  given	  a	  thorough	  coherentist	  rendering	  by	  Thagard	  (1999).	  Consequently,	  while	  it	  should	  be	  favorable	  to	  coherentist	  accounts	  of	  understanding,	  I’ll	  argue	  below	  that	  it	  evinces	  nothing	  stronger	  than	  the	  
appearance	  of	  coherence.	  	   Peptic	  ulcers	  are	  sores	  that	  develop	  in	  the	  stomach	  (gastric	  ulcers)	  or	  in	  the	  duodenum	  (duodenal	  ulcers).	  Through	  the	  1970s,	  biomedical	  scientists	  held	  that	  excess	  acidity	  in	  the	  stomach	  causes	  these	  ulcers.	  Starting	  in	  the	  1970s,	  antacids	  were	  used	  as	  effective	  relief	  from	  peptic	  ulcers,	  although	  they	  did	  not	  cure	  ulcers.	  Furthermore,	  it	  was	  assumed	  that	  bacteria	  could	  not	  survive	  in	  the	  stomach’s	  acidic	  environment.	  However,	  as	  first	  conjectured	  in	  1983	  by	  Australian	  physicians	  Robin	  Warren	  and	  Barry	  Marshall,	  biomedical	  scientists	  now	  hold	  that	  bacteria	  cause	  peptic	  ulcers.	  Consequently,	  antibiotics	  are	  often	  used	  to	  treat	  them. 
	   Focusing	  just	  on	  one	  of	  Warren	  and	  Marshall’s	  (1984)	  earliest	  publications	  of	  these	  ideas,	  we	  can	  already	  see	  the	  process	  of	  scientific	  explanatory	  evaluation	  at	  work.	  In	  that	  study,	  they	  discovered	  the	  bacteria	  that	  would	  later	  be	  called	  
Helicobacter	  pylori	  in	  the	  stomach	  biopsies	  of	  several	  people	  with	  gastritis,	  and	  inferred	  that	  the	  bacteria	  explains	  the	  gastritis.	  Consonant	  with	  the	  first	  and	  second	  features	  of	  explanatory	  evaluation,	  they	  used	  techniques	  and	  evidence	  designed	  to	  eliminate	  several	  alternative	  explanations	  of	  why	  the	  patients	  have	  gastritis,	  or	  how	  the	  bacteria	  entered	  the	  patients’	  systems,	  e.g.	  	   Where	  possible	  patients	  completed	  a	  clinical	  questionnaire	  designed	  to	  detect	  a	  source	  of	  infection	  or	  show	  any	  relationship	  with	  "known"	  causes	  of	  gastritis	  or	  Campylobacter	  infection,	  rather	  than	  give	  a	  detailed	  account	  of	  each	  patient’s	  history.	  The	  emphasis	  was	  on	  animal	  contact,	  travel,	  diet,	  dental	  hygiene,	  and	  drugs,	  rather	  than	  symptoms.	  (1984,	  1311)	  	  Similarly,	  they	  required	  patients	  to	  fast	  at	  least	  four	  hours	  before	  the	  endoscopy,	  used	  certain	  stains	  (e.g.	  haematoxylin	  and	  eosin	  (H&E),	  Warthrin-­‐Starry	  silver,	  Gram),	  cultured	  the	  samples,	  and	  had	  their	  results	  independently	  coded,	  all	  done	  to	  rule	  out	  certain	  results	  as	  mere	  artifacts.	  Here,	  if	  an	  auxiliary	  hypothesis	  better	  explains	  an	  experimental	  result	  than	  a	  hypothesis	  of	  interest,	  that	  result	  is	  merely	  an	  artifact.	  	   Moreover,	  our	  safety	  requirement	  on	  understanding	  provides	  a	  plausible	  
raison	  d’être	  for	  why	  scientists	  undertake	  these	  measures:	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  their	  explanations	  could	  not	  easily	  have	  been	  false.	  In	  modalease,	  they	  are	  setting	  up	  an	  experimental	  situation	  such	  that	  in	  all	  nearby	  possible	  worlds,	  the	  presence	  of	  bacteria	  explains	  why	  the	  patients	  have	  gastritis.	  	   Marshall	  and	  Warren	  found	  evidence	  that	  only	  the	  bacteria	  explanation	  explained.	  For	  instance,	  with	  the	  aforementioned	  questionnaires,	  they	  discovered	  the	  following:	  	   The	  only	  symptom	  which	  correlated	  with	  gastritis	  or	  bacteria	  was	  "burping"	  which	  was	  more	  common	  in	  patients	  with	  bacteria	  (p	  =	  0.03)	  or	  gastritis	  (p	  =	  0.007).	  This	  association	  remained	  when	  patients	  with	  peptic	  ulcer	  were	  excluded.	  None	  of	  the	  other	  questionnaire	  responses	  showed	  any	  relationship	  to	  the	  presence	  of	  gastric	  bacteria	  or	  gastritis.	  (Marshall	  and	  Warren	  1984,	  1312)	  	  Here,	  the	  use	  of	  significance	  testing	  illustrates	  how	  the	  aforementioned	  kind	  of	  scientific	  explanatory	  evaluation	  affords	  us	  understanding,	  for	  a	  low	  p-­‐value	  indicates	  that	  the	  correlation	  between	  explanans	  and	  explanandum	  could	  not	  easily	  have	  been	  a	  fluke.	  Similarly,	  the	  endoscopy	  results	  indicated	  a	  very	  close	  correlation	  between	  ulcers	  and	  bacteria	  (p	  =	  0.0002).	  	   We	  see	  more	  evidence	  of	  safety	  guiding	  Marshall	  and	  Warren’s	  study	  when	  we	  turn	  to	  the	  histopathological	  tests	  for	  their	  explanation:	  	  
Gastritis	  could	  usually	  be	  graded	  with	  confidence	  at	  low	  magnification.	  There	  was	  some	  difficulty	  with	  about	  25	  cases	  where	  the	  changes	  were	  mild	  or	  the	  specimens	  were	  small,	  superficial,	  or	  distorted.	  To	  ensure	  that	  gradings	  were	  reliable,	  single	  H	  &	  E	  sections	  from	  the	  last	  40	  cases	  were	  examined	  "blind"	  by	  another	  pathologist	  who	  agreed	  with	  the	  presence	  or	  absence	  of	  gastritis	  in	  36	  cases	  (90%),	  and	  gave	  an	  identical	  grading	  in	  32.	  (Marshall	  and	  Warren	  1984,	  1312)	  	  Thus,	  once	  again,	  the	  scientists	  achieved	  understanding	  only	  when	  they	  created	  a	  “safe	  space”	  for	  their	  explanations.	  	  Importantly,	  Marshall	  and	  Warren	  also	  provided	  an	  explanation	  that	  challenged	  the	  widely	  held	  belief	  that	  the	  stomach	  was	  inhospitable	  to	  bacteria.	  The	  bacteria	  were	  discovered	  to	  be	  able	  to	  survive	  stomach	  acid	  by	  burrowing	  beneath	  the	  mucous	  layer	  in	  the	  stomach,	  and	  producing	  enzymes	  that	  neutralize	  acid.	  This	  helps	  them	  to	  account	  for	  evidence	  that	  would	  otherwise	  render	  their	  account	  implausible.	  	   Regarding	  the	  third	  feature	  of	  explanatory	  evaluation,	  belief-­‐formation,	  Marshall	  and	  Warren	  first	  discuss	  the	  failure	  of	  other	  explanations	  of	  gastritis	  and	  ulcers,	  and	  then	  assert	  the	  following:	  	  	   We	  know	  of	  no	  other	  disease	  state	  where,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  complicating	  factors	  such	  as	  ulceration	  […],	  bacteria	  and	  PMNs	  [polymorphonuclear	  leucocytes,	  a	  telltale	  sign	  of	  gastritis]	  are	  so	  intimately	  related	  without	  the	  bacteria	  being	  pathogenic.	  (Marshall	  and	  Warren	  1984,	  1314)	  	  This	  is	  not	  quite	  an	  assertion	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  bacteria	  explains	  gastritis,	  but	  that	  is	  consonant	  with	  my	  idea	  that	  a	  doxastic	  state	  should	  be	  based	  on	  the	  explanatory	  comparisons.	  Since	  Marshall	  and	  Warren	  were	  offering	  a	  brand	  new	  explanation	  of	  gastritis,	  they	  might	  reasonably	  have	  thought	  that	  more	  explanatory	  evaluation	  was	  in	  order.	  Hence,	  their	  qualifier	  about	  this	  explanation	  is	  in	  line	  with	  SKU.	  Importantly,	  this	  was	  just	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  explanation’s	  career;	  several	  subsequent	  observations	  and	  experiments	  precipitated	  this	  advance	  in	  our	  understanding	  of	  peptic	  ulcers.	  Marshall	  and	  Warren	  discovered	  that	  antibiotics	  cure	  peptic	  ulcers.	  Later,	  the	  previous	  consensus	  that	  the	  stomach	  was	  too	  acidic	  to	  host	  bacteria	  was	  flatly	  refuted,	  as	  H.	  pylori	  was	  microscopically	  observed,	  and	  was	  grown	  in	  laboratory	  cultures	  (Marshall	  et	  al.	  1990).	  Also,	  several	  studies	  indicated	  higher	  rates	  of	  ulcer	  healing	  and	  lower	  rates	  of	  recurrence	  among	  ulcer	  sufferers	  in	  whom	  H.	  pylori	  was	  eradicated	  (e.g.,	  Marshall	  et	  al.	  1988).	  Parallel	  points	  about	  safety	  and	  the	  three	  features	  of	  explanatory	  evaluation	  apply	  to	  these	  studies.	  Thus,	  we	  see	  that	  several	  scientific	  practices	  accord	  with	  SKU,	  as	  described	  above.	  In	  particular,	  various	  experimental	  controls	  and	  statistical	  tests	  are	  consonant	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  we	  achieve	  understanding	  if	  our	  explanatory	  commitments	  are	  based	  on	  considering	  and	  comparing	  competing	  explanations,	  and	  if	  these	  commitments	  could	  not	  easily	  have	  been	  false.	  Understanding	  why	  some	  people	  have	  ulcers	  amounts	  to	  emulating	  (to	  some	  degree)	  the	  kind	  of	  knowledge	  that	  Marshall,	  Warren,	  and	  their	  successors	  had	  of	  H.	  pylori.	  
3. Debunking	  the	  Connection	  Argument	  With	  CU	  and	  SKU	  in	  hand,	  I’ll	  now	  argue	  that	  coherentists’	  monopoly	  on	  grasping	  myriad	  connections	  is	  illusory:	  SKU	  explains	  why	  understanding	  involves	  grasping	  connections	  better	  than	  CU.	  Consequently,	  the	  Connection	  Argument	  is	  unsound.	  	  Specifically,	  I’ll	  argue	  in	  two	  steps.	  First,	  scientific	  explanatory	  evaluation	  entails	  something	  that	  resembles	  coherence,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  understanding	  involves	  grasping	  several	  “coherence-­‐making”	  relationships—namely,	  explanation,	  conditional	  probability,	  and	  inference	  (§3.1).	  Then,	  I’ll	  show	  that	  this	  web-­‐like	  simulacrum	  is	  compatible	  with	  a	  denial	  of	  coherentism	  (§3.2).	  Combined,	  I	  take	  these	  points	  to	  show	  that	  the	  balance	  of	  arguments	  suggests	  that	  understanding	  is	  only	  quasi-­‐coherent.	  
3.1. SKU	  and	  the	  Connection	  Argument	  Recall	  the	  contentious	  premise	  in	  the	  Connection	  Argument:	  	  	   Coherentism	  about	  understanding	  (i.e.	  CU)	  best	  explains	  why,	  ceteris	  paribus,	  if	  S1	  grasps	  more	  connections	  between	  p	  and	  other	  relevant	  propositions	  than	  S2,	  then	  S1	  better	  understands	  why	  p	  than	  S2.	  	  	  I’ll	  now	  argue	  against	  this	  claim.	  Specifically,	  I	  will	  show	  that	  SKU	  explains	  why	  understanding	  involves	  grasping	  connections	  better	  than	  CU.	  To	  see	  this,	  suppose	  that	  S’s	  true	  belief	  that	  q1	  explains	  p	  is	  the	  result	  of	  scientific	  explanatory	  evaluation,	  as	  described	  in	  §2.1.	  Then	  S	  has	  considered	  and	  compared	  other	  explanations	  of	  p	  and	  found	  them	  wanting.	  Furthermore,	  let	  two	  propositions	  a	  and	  b	  stand	  in	  a	  
positive	  relationship	  if	  a	  explains	  b,	  a	  can	  be	  inferred	  from	  b,	  or	  P(a|b)	  is	  relatively	  high.5	  Finally,	  assume	  that	  a	  and	  b	  stand	  in	  a	  negative	  relationship	  if	  a	  and	  b	  are	  competing	  explanations	  of	  some	  third	  proposition	  c,	  ~a	  can	  be	  inferred	  from	  b,	  or	  P(~a|b)	  is	  relatively	  high.	  In	  the	  stage	  of	  comparison,	  any	  potential	  explanation	  of	  p	  will	  stand	  in	  a	  positive	  explanatory	  relation	  with	  p,	  but	  in	  order	  for	  q1	  to	  supersede	  q2	  as	  an	  explanation	  of	  p,	  the	  former	  must	  either	  stand	  in	  a	  positive	  relationship	  with	  some	  further	  evidence	  e,	  or	  the	  latter	  stands	  in	  a	  negative	  relationship	  with	  e.	  Pictorially,	  we	  can	  represent	  a	  simple	  instance	  of	  this	  thusly:	  
	  
Figure	  1:	  Simple	  case	  of	  explanatory	  evaluation.	  Thin	  lines	  indicate	  explanatory	  relationships;	  thick	  lines,	  inferential	  relations;	  solid	  lines,	  positive	  relations;	  dotted	  lines,	  negative	  relations.	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This	  structure	  will	  simply	  repeat	  itself	  if	  S	  considers	  more	  explanations	  of	  p,	  and	  still	  finds	  q1	  to	  be	  the	  best	  of	  them,	  thereby	  looking	  more	  web-­‐like.	  Thus,	  q1	  will	  always	  stand	  in	  at	  least	  as	  many	  positive	  relationships	  as	  its	  competition.	  However,	  we	  should	  also	  require	  that	  q1	  does	  not	  stand	  in	  any	  negative	  relationship	  (modulo	  its	  competition	  with	  other	  explanations).6	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  rider	  is	  that	  if	  q1	  stands	  in	  one	  of	  these	  negative	  relationships,	  q1	  may	  be	  the	  best	  of	  the	  bad	  lot	  of	  explanations	  that	  S	  has	  considered.	  In	  such	  a	  case,	  S’s	  belief	  that	  q1	  explains	  p	  could	  easily	  have	  been	  false.	  	   To	  render	  this	  more	  concrete,	  let’s	  consider	  Thagard’s	  coherentist	  representation	  of	  scientists’	  understanding	  of	  peptic	  ulcers:	  
	  
Figure	  2.	  Coherence	  relations	  in	  assessing	  the	  acceptability	  of	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  bacteria	  cause	  ulcers	  
(circa	  1995).	  Thin	  lines	  indicate	  explanatory	  relationships	  (explanantia	  are	  above	  explananda;	  horizontal	  lines	  indicate	  “co-­‐explanations”),	  and	  thick	  lines	  indicate	  contradictions	  or	  explanatory	  competition	  (Thagard	  1999).	  	   While	  Thagard	  explicates	  this	  episode	  using	  explanatory	  coherence,	  we	  can	  deliver	  the	  same	  verdict	  using	  SKU.	  There	  are	  two	  explanations	  of	  why	  some	  people	  have	  ulcers:	  the	  bacterial	  explanation	  and	  the	  acid	  explanation,	  and	  the	  former	  stands	  in	  far	  more	  positive	  relationships	  than	  the	  latter;	  neither	  explanation	  stands	  in	  negative	  relationships	  in	  Thagard’s	  diagram.	  Thus,	  SKU	  explains	  why	  understanding	  involves	  grasping	  connections	  at	  least	  as	  well	  as	  CU.	  Below,	  I	  discuss	  Thagard’s	  view	  in	  greater	  detail.	  However,	  my	  current	  point—that	  we	  can	  get	  exactly	  the	  same	  explanatory	  connections	  using	  either	  CU	  or	  SKU—doesn’t	  hinge	  on	  those	  details.	  So	  far,	  I’ve	  played	  for	  the	  tie:	  SKU	  is	  at	  least	  as	  good	  as	  CU	  in	  explaining	  the	  relevant	  intuitions.	  This	  suffices	  to	  unseat	  the	  Connection	  Argument,	  but	  just	  for	  fun,	  I’ll	  now	  go	  for	  the	  win—SKU	  better	  explains	  our	  intuitions	  about	  understanding	  than	  CU.	  Consider	  a	  case	  in	  which	  someone	  has	  a	  belief	  in	  an	  explanation	  that	  fares	  well	  with	  respect	  CU	  but	  not	  SKU,	  and	  contrast	  him	  with	  a	  person	  whose	  fortunes	  are	  reversed:	  	  	  
• Andy	  consults	  an	  arbitrarily	  large	  number	  n	  of	  independent	  experts,	  all	  of	  whom	  tell	  him	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  bacteria	  explains	  why	  some	  people	  have	  
peptic	  ulcers,	  but	  none	  of	  these	  experts	  provide	  any	  further	  details	  about	  the	  evidence	  by	  which	  they	  arrived	  at	  this	  belief,	  and	  Andy	  doesn't	  have	  the	  slightest	  clue	  as	  to	  what	  this	  evidence	  would	  be.	  	  
• Betty	  consults	  no	  experts,	  but	  carefully	  considers	  all	  of	  the	  viable	  explanations,	  and	  learns	  many	  details	  about	  m	  different	  experiments,	  which	  are	  sufficient	  for	  her	  to	  adjudicate	  between	  these	  different	  explanations	  and	  for	  her	  true	  belief	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  bacteria	  explains	  why	  some	  people	  have	  
peptic	  ulcers	  to	  be	  safe.	  	  Finally,	  let	  us	  add	  that	  m	  is	  much	  smaller	  than	  n,	  such	  that	  Andy’s	  belief	  system	  is	  far	  more	  coherent	  than	  Betty’s.	  Yet,	  Betty’s	  understanding	  of	  peptic	  ulcers	  is	  intuitively	  superior	  to	  Andy’s.	  SKU	  explains	  this	  intuition:	  Betty	  better	  approximates	  scientific	  knowledge	  than	  Andy.	  A	  coherentist	  account,	  such	  as	  CU,	  delivers	  precisely	  the	  opposite	  verdict.	  Thus,	  not	  only	  does	  SKU	  capture	  the	  intuition	  that	  we	  achieve	  understanding	  by	  grasping	  inter-­‐propositional	  connections,	  it	  also	  accounts	  for	  why	  certain	  connections	  don’t	  provide	  as	  much	  understanding	  as	  others.	  On	  this	  latter	  front,	  it	  outperforms	  a	  purely	  coherentist	  approach.	  Perhaps	  a	  coherentist	  would	  reply	  that	  coherentist	  considerations	  are	  sliding	  in	  through	  the	  back	  door,	  for	  Betty	  must	  use	  a	  sizeable	  amount	  of	  background	  knowledge	  to	  achieve	  her	  understanding.	  However,	  since	  n	  can	  be	  arbitrarily	  large,	  this	  reply	  won’t	  guarantee	  that	  Betty’s	  understanding	  is	  more	  coherent	  than	  Andy’s.	  Furthermore,	  any	  such	  response	  must	  consider	  cases	  in	  which	  Andy’s	  background	  knowledge	  about	  his	  various	  testimonial	  sources	  offsets	  any	  gains	  that	  Betty	  would	  gain	  from	  her	  background	  knowledge.	  Note	  that	  we	  have	  done	  this	  while	  effectively	  assuming	  that	  Andy’s	  consulting	  of	  the	  various	  experts	  is	  safe.	  However,	  most	  coherentists	  don’t	  have	  a	  safety	  condition	  built	  into	  their	  account,	  so	  things	  are	  even	  worse	  for	  the	  coherentist	  when	  we	  relax	  this	  assumption.7	  For	  instance,	  consider	  the	  following:	  	  
• Charlie	  consults	  the	  same	  number	  n	  of	  independent	  pseudo-­‐experts	  that	  still	  explain	  peptic	  ulcers	  with	  bacteria.	  In	  addition	  to	  telling	  him	  that	  bacteria	  explains	  peptic	  ulcers,	  each	  pseudo-­‐expert	  tells	  Charlie	  that	  the	  exact	  same	  experimental	  result	  e	  is	  the	  best	  scientific	  evidence	  for	  believing	  this	  explanation,	  and	  Charlie	  accepts	  this	  testimony.	  From	  Charlie’s	  perspective,	  e	  coheres	  with	  the	  bacterial	  explanation	  of	  ulcers.	  However,	  the	  experiment	  that	  produced	  e	  was	  never	  performed;	  it	  is	  a	  complete	  fabrication	  that	  each	  of	  these	  pseudo-­‐experts	  (through	  dumb	  luck)	  concocted	  independently	  of	  the	  other.	  No	  real	  scientist	  would	  assent	  to	  e.	  	  Clearly,	  like	  Andy,	  Charlie	  understands	  worse	  than	  Betty,	  and	  there’s	  no	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  Charlie’s	  belief	  system	  is	  any	  less	  coherent	  than	  Andy’s.	  Indeed,	  the	  presence	  of	  e	  might	  make	  Charlie’s	  beliefs	  more	  coherent	  than	  Andy’s.	  Thus,	  
scientific	  explanatory	  evaluation	  seems	  far	  more	  central	  to	  understanding	  than	  coherence.	  Finally,	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  completeness,	  consider	  the	  following:	  	  
• Doug	  consults	  no	  experts,	  but	  considers	  all	  of	  the	  viable	  explanations,	  and	  learns	  many	  details	  about	  m	  different	  experiments,	  which	  are	  sufficient	  for	  him	  to	  adjudicate	  between	  these	  different	  explanations,	  but	  his	  true	  belief	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  bacteria	  explains	  why	  some	  people	  have	  peptic	  ulcers	  is	  unsafe.	  	  For	  instance,	  suppose	  that	  Doug	  makes	  a	  systematic	  and	  far-­‐reaching	  mistake	  about	  experimental	  design,	  but	  this	  confusion	  fortuitously	  cancels	  itself	  out	  given	  that	  he	  has	  looked	  at	  precisely	  these	  experiments.	  Had	  he	  looked	  at	  either	  m+1	  or	  m-­‐1	  experiments,	  he	  would	  have	  formed	  a	  false	  belief	  about	  the	  causes	  of	  peptic	  ulcers.	  Once	  again,	  the	  intuition	  is	  that	  Doug	  does	  not	  understand	  peptic	  ulcers	  as	  well	  as	  Betty.	  SKU	  delivers	  this	  verdict,	  but	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  Betty	  and	  Doug	  differ	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  coherence	  of	  their	  beliefs.	  
3.2. Compatibility	  with	  Foundationalism	  Thus	  far,	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  SKU	  is	  at	  least	  as	  good	  as	  CU	  in	  accounting	  for	  our	  intuitions	  about	  understanding,	  and	  might	  well	  surpass	  it.	  But	  one	  may	  worry	  that	  because	  SKU	  doesn’t	  offer	  an	  analysis	  of	  knowledge,	  there	  is	  an	  implicit	  coherentism	  in	  my	  view.	  To	  eliminate	  this	  possibility,	  I’ll	  now	  argue	  that	  SKU	  is	  compatible	  with	  foundationalism.	  Importantly,	  the	  only	  claim	  being	  made	  here	  is	  that	  SKU	  is	  
consistent	  with	  foundationalism.	  I	  make	  no	  stronger	  claim	  about	  whether	  understanding	  entails	  foundationalism,	  for	  only	  the	  weaker	  claim	  is	  needed	  to	  show	  that	  the	  preceding	  doesn’t	  impose	  any	  significant	  coherentist	  requirement	  on	  understanding.	  To	  do	  this,	  we’ll	  need	  to	  clarify	  what	  foundationalism	  entails:	  	  (FJ)	   S’s	  justification	  j	  for	  the	  explanation	  of	  p	  by	  q	  is	  foundational	  if	  and	  only	  if	  j	  itself	  is	  justified,	  and	  one	  of	  the	  following	  holds:	  (a) j	  is	  not	  part	  of	  S’s	  belief	  system;	  or	  (b) if	  j	  did	  not	  stand	  in	  any	  explanatory,	  probabilistic,	  or	  inferential	  relationships	  with	  members	  of	  S’s	  belief	  system,	  then	  j	  would	  still	  be	  justified;	  or	  (c) there	  is	  some	  other	  member	  of	  S’s	  belief	  system,	  b,	  that	  justifies	  j,	  and,	  had	  b	  not	  stood	  in	  any	  explanatory,	  probabilistic,	  or	  inferential	  relationships	  with	  members	  of	  S’s	  belief	  system,	  then	  b	  would	  still	  be	  justified.	  	  The	  first	  of	  these	  conditions	  rejects	  the	  coherentist’s	  credo	  that	  only	  a	  belief	  can	  justify	  a	  belief;	  the	  second	  treats	  j	  as	  a	  self-­‐justifying	  or	  basic	  belief;	  and	  the	  third	  treats	  j’s	  justification	  as	  derivative	  of	  some	  other	  basic	  belief	  b.	  This	  captures	  the	  core	  ideas	  of	  epistemic	  foundationalism.	  Thus,	  a	  genuine	  coherence	  constraint	  would	  deny	  all	  three	  of	  these	  conditions.	  Note	  that	  FJ	  is	  not	  Cartesian	  
foundationalism.	  In	  particular,	  I	  assume	  that	  fallibilism	  and	  foundationalism	  are	  consistent.	  Quick	  inspection	  of	  SKU	  and	  FJ	  reveals	  no	  contradiction.	  To	  see	  this	  more	  clearly,	  suppose	  that	  the	  edges	  of	  the	  coherentist’s	  web—the	  deliverances	  of	  perception—are	  banished	  to	  the	  foundationalist’s	  basement.	  Then	  S	  can	  still	  believe	  an	  explanation	  and	  grasp	  its	  many	  relationships	  to	  her	  other	  beliefs	  through	  scientific	  explanatory	  evaluation.	  Hence,	  foundationalists	  can	  accept	  SKU.	  	  Indeed,	  here	  it’s	  worth	  noting	  that	  Thagard—who	  has	  provided	  one	  of	  the	  most	  descriptively	  adequate	  accounts	  of	  coherence	  to	  date,	  including	  how	  scientists	  came	  to	  accept	  the	  bacterial	  theory	  of	  ulcers—relies	  on	  epistemic	  principles	  that	  are	  consistent	  with	  FJ.	  Specifically,	  one	  of	  Thagard’s	  (1992,	  66)	  principles	  of	  (so-­‐called)	  explanatory	  coherence,	  “Data	  Priority,”	  holds	  that	  “Propositions	  that	  describe	  the	  results	  of	  observation	  have	  a	  degree	  of	  acceptability	  on	  their	  own.”	  However,	  Data	  Priority	  is	  basically	  a	  restatement	  of	  FJ’s	  condition	  (b),	  save	  that	  it	  specifies	  that	  basic	  beliefs	  are	  restricted	  to	  “the	  results	  of	  observation.”	  	  At	  this	  point,	  it’s	  tempting	  to	  rebut	  this	  by	  re-­‐litigating	  epistemic	  coherentism	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  its	  decades-­‐old	  conflict	  with	  foundationalism.8	  In	  other	  words,	  after	  demythologizing	  the	  given,	  defusing	  various	  isolation	  objections,	  disproving	  various	  impossibility	  results,	  etc.	  one	  might	  think	  that	  understanding	  is	  coherent,	  simply	  because	  one	  also	  holds	  that	  all	  justification	  is	  coherentist.	  But	  this	  is	  problematic	  in	  two	  ways.	  First,	  it	  is	  arguable	  whether	  coherentism	  emerges	  triumphant	  from	  this	  battery	  of	  considerations	  (Olsson	  2005,	  2012).	  Second,	  even	  if	  this	  could	  be	  shown,	  it’s	  not	  clear	  that	  the	  outcome	  of	  this	  debate—which	  was	  originally	  situated	  within	  an	  analysis	  of	  knowledge—is	  relevant	  to	  an	  analysis	  of	  
understanding.	  After	  all,	  whether	  FJ	  is	  true	  or	  false,	  agents	  will	  “grasp”	  exactly	  the	  same	  relationships	  within	  their	  cognitive	  systems,	  and	  that	  seems	  to	  be	  all	  that	  matters	  for	  the	  Connection	  Argument.	  	  To	  summarize,	  we’ve	  seen	  that	  SKU	  explains	  away	  the	  intuition	  that	  motivates	  coherence	  requirements	  on	  understanding—namely	  that	  we	  must	  grasp	  how	  things	  hang	  together—without	  any	  real	  commitment	  to	  coherentism.	  As	  a	  result,	  there	  is	  no	  strong	  motivation	  for	  coherence	  requirements	  on	  understanding.	  Moreover,	  we’ve	  told	  a	  broadly	  diagnostic	  story:	  understanding	  involves	  grasping	  connections,	  and	  this	  gives	  the	  appearance	  of	  coherence.	  Hence,	  understanding	  is	  quasi-­‐coherent.	  
4. A	  Dilemma	  for	  Robust	  Coherence	  Requirements	  	  However,	  the	  preceding	  does	  not	  yet	  seal	  coherence’s	  coffin.	  In	  particular,	  one	  may	  grant	  that	  SKU	  captures	  many	  important	  features	  of	  understanding,	  but	  then	  insist	  on	  a	  further	  coherence	  requirement	  to	  boost	  understanding	  even	  further.	  To	  extinguish	  this	  last	  coherentist	  ember,	  I’ll	  argue	  that	  any	  coherence	  requirements	  stronger	  than	  the	  quasi-­‐coherence	  entailed	  by	  SKU	  do	  not	  enhance	  understanding.	  In	  broad	  outlines,	  the	  reasoning	  for	  this	  is	  as	  follows:	  either	  a	  coherence	  requirement	  figures	  in	  scientific	  explanatory	  evaluation	  or	  it	  doesn’t.	  If	  such	  a	  requirement	  figures	  in	  scientific	  explanatory	  evaluation,	  then	  it	  fails	  to	  be	  stronger	  
than	  SKU.	  In	  other	  words,	  it’s	  redundant	  given	  my	  “science-­‐first”	  account	  of	  understanding.	  Alternatively,	  if	  a	  coherence	  requirement	  does	  not	  figure	  in	  scientific	  explanatory	  evaluation,	  then	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  it’s	  unnecessary	  for	  understanding—an	  extravagance.	  Thus,	  ambitious	  coherentism	  seems	  on	  a	  collision	  course	  with	  either	  redundancy	  or	  extravagance.	  If	  this	  is	  correct,	  we	  have	  even	  further	  reason	  to	  suspect	  that	  understanding	  is	  only	  quasi-­‐coherent.	  To	  add	  some	  flesh	  to	  these	  bones,	  I’ll	  now	  interpret	  three	  popular	  coherence	  theories	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  this	  general	  argument.9	  
4.1. Thagard	  Let’s	  first	  consider	  Thagard’s	  (1992,	  65-­‐66;	  2000,	  43)	  explanatory	  coherence	  theory:	  	  	  
Principle	  E1	  (Symmetry):	  Explanatory	  coherence	  is	  a	  symmetric	  relation,	  unlike,	  say,	  conditional	  probability.	  That	  is,	  two	  propositions	  A	  and	  B	  cohere	  with	  each	  other	  equally.	  
Principle	  E2	  (Explanation):	  	  a. A	  hypothesis	  coheres	  with	  what	  it	  explains,	  which	  can	  either	  be	  evidence	  or	  another	  hypothesis.	  b. Hypotheses	  that	  together	  explain	  some	  other	  proposition	  cohere	  with	  each	  other.	  c. The	  more	  hypotheses	  it	  takes	  to	  explain	  something,	  the	  lower	  the	  degree	  of	  coherence.	  
Principle	  E3	  (Analogy):	  Similar	  hypotheses	  that	  explain	  similar	  pieces	  of	  evidence	  cohere.	  
Principle	  E4	  (Data	  Priority):	  Propositions	  that	  describe	  the	  results	  of	  observation	  have	  a	  degree	  of	  acceptability	  on	  their	  own.	  
Principle	  E5	  (Contradiction):	  Contradictory	  propositions	  are	  incoherent	  with	  each	  other.	  
Principle	  E6	  (Competition)	  If	  A	  and	  B	  both	  explain	  a	  proposition,	  and	  if	  A	  and	  B	  are	  not	  explanatorily	  connected,	  then	  A	  and	  B	  are	  incoherent	  with	  each	  other	  (A	  and	  B	  are	  explanatorily	  connected	  if	  one	  explains	  the	  other	  or	  if	  together	  they	  explain	  something).	  
Principle	  E7	  (Acceptance):	  The	  acceptability	  of	  a	  proposition	  in	  a	  system	  of	  propositions	  depends	  on	  its	  coherence	  with	  them.	  
	  As	  we’ve	  already	  seen,	  Principle	  E4	  undermines	  Thagard’s	  claim	  to	  being	  a	  proper	  coherentist,	  since	  it	  entails	  foundationalism.	  However,	  even	  if	  we	  bracket	  this	  point,	  Thagard’s	  position	  falls	  prey	  to	  the	  dilemma	  of	  redundancy	  and	  extravagance	  sketched	  above.	  Note	  that	  Thagard’s	  view	  overlaps	  substantially	  with	  our	  own.	  In	  particular,	  E2a	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  explanations	  yield	  positive	  relationships;	  E4,	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  evidence	  matters	  to	  explanatory	  evaluation;	  E5	  and	  E6,	  with	  some	  of	  our	  negative	  relationships.	  Consequently,	  these	  principles	  appear	  redundant.	  Hence,	  if	  Thagard	  offers	  stronger	  coherence	  requirements	  than	  SKU,	  then	  it	  is	  because	  of	  the	  remaining	  principles.	  
If	  Principle	  E2b	  offers	  distinctive	  contributions	  to	  understanding,	  they	  are	  unclear.	  Obviously,	  understanding	  is	  sometimes	  achieved	  only	  by	  grasping	  how	  complementary	  hypotheses	  contribute	  to	  an	  explanation.	  However,	  in	  that	  case	  one	  simply	  has	  a	  more	  complex	  explanans,	  which	  SKU	  can	  readily	  assimilate.	  Consequently,	  E2b	  is,	  at	  best,	  redundant.	  	   Some	  of	  the	  remaining	  principles	  only	  appear	  relevant	  if	  coherence	  has	  already	  been	  shown	  to	  figure	  in	  understanding.	  For	  instance,	  although	  Principle	  E1	  stipulates	  that	  coherence	  is	  a	  symmetric	  relationship,	  all	  of	  the	  coherence-­‐making	  relationships	  are	  asymmetric.	  Thagard	  explicitly	  acknowledges	  this	  with	  respect	  to	  conditional	  probability	  above,	  and	  also	  accepts	  that	  explanation	  is	  asymmetric.10	  Hence,	  E1	  only	  becomes	  relevant	  if	  a	  stronger	  coherence	  requirement	  on	  understanding	  can	  be	  established.	  Since	  that’s	  precisely	  what’s	  at	  stake,	  E1	  puts	  the	  cart	  before	  the	  horse.	  Similar	  points	  apply	  to	  E7.	  The	  remaining	  principles	  are	  E2c,	  which	  prizes	  simpler	  explanations,	  and	  E3,	  which	  prizes	  explanatory	  analogies.	  Note	  that	  insofar	  as	  these	  virtues	  assist	  in	  scientific	  explanatory	  evaluation,	  the	  redundancy	  objection	  stands.	  Thus,	  they	  must	  sidestep	  the	  extravagance	  objection	  by	  contributing	  to	  understanding	  in	  other	  ways.	  Such	  contributions	  may	  be	  in	  the	  offing,	  but	  I	  wish	  to	  point	  out	  that	  there	  are	  strong	  reasons	  to	  think	  that	  simplicity	  and	  analogy	  sometimes	  are	  idle	  with	  respect	  to	  understanding.	  Indeed,	  I	  will	  now	  argue	  that	  there’s	  little	  evidence	  that	  they	  play	  any	  role	  in	  our	  understanding	  of	  peptic	  ulcers.	  	  Thagard	  (1999,	  Ch.4)	  claims	  that	  the	  bacterial	  theory	  of	  ulcers	  was	  accepted	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  its	  explanatory	  coherence.	  If	  this	  were	  true,	  then	  we	  would	  expect	  that	  the	  scientific	  articles	  that	  Thagard	  cites	  in	  his	  discussion	  of	  this	  historical	  episode	  to	  use	  many	  keywords	  associated	  with	  explanatory	  coherence.	  I	  decided	  to	  test	  this	  hypothesis.	  To	  assess	  this,	  I	  compiled	  the	  27	  publications	  written	  by	  biomedical	  scientists	  researching	  ulcers	  and	  cited	  by	  Thagard.11	  	   The	  next	  step	  was	  to	  find	  distinctively	  explanationist	  terms.	  These	  were	  determined	  using	  Thagard’s	  remaining	  two	  principles	  of	  explanatory	  coherence:	  	   1. Simplicity:	  The	  more	  hypotheses	  it	  takes	  to	  explain	  something,	  the	  lower	  the	  degree	  of	  coherence;	  and	  2. Analogy:	  Similar	  hypotheses	  that	  explain	  similar	  pieces	  of	  evidence	  cohere.	  	  To	  give	  explanatory	  coherentism	  a	  fair	  hearing,	  I	  also	  included	  Lycan’s	  (2002)	  account	  of	  the	  theoretical	  virtues:	  	   3. Scope:	  Other	  things	  being	  equal,	  prefer	  T1	  to	  T2	  if	  T1	  explains	  more	  than	  T2;	  4. Testability:	  Other	  things	  being	  equal,	  prefer	  T1	  to	  T2	  if	  T1	  is	  more	  readily	  testable	  than	  T2;	  5. Neatness:	  Other	  things	  being	  equal,	  prefer	  T1	  to	  T2	  if	  T1	  leaves	  fewer	  messy	  unanswered	  questions	  behind;	  6. Fecundity:	  Other	  things	  being	  equal,	  prefer	  T1	  to	  T2	  if	  T1	  is	  more	  fruitful	  in	  suggesting	  further	  related	  hypotheses,	  or	  parallel	  hypotheses	  in	  other	  areas;	  and	  
7. Conservatism:	  Other	  things	  being	  equal,	  prefer	  T1	  to	  T2	  if	  T1	  squares	  better	  with	  what	  you	  already	  believe.	  	  I	  then	  performed	  searches	  over	  the	  aforementioned	  directory	  for	  various	  words	  from	  these	  seven	  criteria,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  cognates.12	  The	  results	  of	  these	  searches	  are	  summarized	  here:	  	  





total	  #	  articles	  
(27)	  simpl	   14	   7	   0.52	  analog	   4	   3	   0.15	  similar	   64	   24	   2.37	  scope,	  consilien,	  	  explains	  more,	  power	   1	   1	   0.04	  test	   217	   25	   8.04	  neat,	  mess,	  unanswered	   0	   0	   0	  fecund,	  fruitful	   1	   1	   0.04	  conserv,	  already,	  consistent	  with	   22	   11	   0.81	  cohere	   0	   0	   0	  explain,	  explanat	   27	   17	   1	  differ	   154	   22	   5.70	  p	  <	  or	  p	  =	  13	   96	   12	   3.56	  statistic	   56	   14	   2.07	  
Table	  1:	  Word	  counts	  for	  key	  articles	  in	  the	  discovery	  of	  bacterial	  theory	  of	  ulcers.	  Gray	  rows	  reflect	  words	  that	  are	  not	  part	  of	  the	  explanatory	  coherentist	  framework.	  The	  results	  suggest	  that	  the	  scientists	  did	  not	  explicitly	  use	  simplicity	  and	  analogy.	  Rather,	  it	  appears	  that	  citing	  various	  pieces	  of	  statistical	  and	  experimental	  evidence	  and	  being	  well	  versed	  in	  the	  methodology	  that	  licenses	  inferences	  from	  evidence	  to	  explanation	  can	  be	  achieved	  with	  nary	  a	  reference	  to	  simplicity	  or	  analogy.	  Such	  a	  person	  seems	  to	  have	  achieved	  significant	  understanding,	  and	  does	  not	  even	  appear	  to	  be	  converging	  towards	  explanatory	  coherence.	  	   Let’s	  first	  look	  at	  simplicity.	  Of	  the	  fourteen	  references	  to	  simplicity,	  there	  appear	  to	  be	  four	  chief	  senses	  of	  “simplicity”:	  	  
• The	  scientists	  referred	  to	  simple	  therapies	  or	  protocols	  (not	  explanations)	  that	  are	  easy	  for	  patients	  to	  comply	  with,	  e.g.	  “We	  have	  observed	  that	  triple	  therapy	  is	  often	  not	  effective	  in	  patients	  who	  have	  previously	  received	  metronidazole,	  and	  compliance	  with	  the	  complicated	  treatment	  protocols	  remains	  a	  major	  problem.	  Simpler	  protocols	  and	  improved	  therapies	  are	  needed”	  (Graham	  et	  al.	  1992,	  708;	  emphasis	  added).	  	  
• The	  scientists	  also	  referred	  to	  simple	  therapies	  or	  protocols	  (not	  explanations)	  that	  have	  fewer	  side	  effects,	  e.g.	  “Side	  effects	  from	  our	  regimen	  resulted	  in	  10	  patients	  failing	  to	  take	  all	  the	  treatment	  and	  a	  further	  8	  reported	  mild	  side	  effects	  but	  finished	  treatment.	  Previous	  attempts	  to	  find	  a	  more	  simple	  and	  effective	  regimen	  that	  eliminates	  H.	  pylori	  have	  invariably	  resulted	  in	  lower	  eradication	  rates”	  (Hosking	  et	  al.	  1994,	  510;	  emphasis	  added).	  However,	  if	  X	  is	  a	  side	  effect	  of	  Y,	  then	  Y	  explains	  X.	  Hence,	  more	  side	  effects	  would	  actually	  increase	  explanatory	  coherence,	  so	  simplicity	  in	  this	  sense	  is	  antithetical	  to	  the	  simplicity	  of	  an	  explanation.	  	  
• The	  scientists	  also	  mention	  simple	  methods	  and	  tests	  (not	  explanations),	  which	  seems	  to	  mean	  nothing	  more	  than	  tests	  that	  are	  easy	  to	  use,	  e.g.	  	  	  At	  endoscopy,	  the	  simplest	  method	  of	  diagnosis	  is	  mucosal	  biopsy	  […]	  C14	  test	  is	  less	  expensive	  and	  simpler	  […]	  Simple	  biopsy	  test	  done	  at	  endoscopy	  […]	  Available	  to	  all	  gastroenterologists.	  Simple	  and	  very	  accurate…	  Serology	  is	  the	  simplest	  and	  most	  widely	  available	  diagnostic	  test	  […]	  Although	  less	  accurate	  than	  the	  best	  serum	  ELISA	  methods,	  these	  tests	  may	  be	  equal	  to	  rapid	  office	  tests,	  are	  simpler,	  and	  may	  be	  particularly	  appropriate	  for	  children	  […]	  The	  European	  "standard"	  13C-­‐urea	  breath	  test	  uses	  a	  simplified	  method	  with	  only	  one	  or	  two	  samples	  taken	  […]	  The	  14C-­‐urea	  test	  exposes	  the	  patient	  to	  radiation	  equivalent	  to	  one	  thousandth	  of	  an	  upper	  GI	  series	  and	  is	  
simpler	  than	  the	  13C	  test.	  (Marshall	  1994,	  S121-­‐S122;	  emphasis	  added)14	  	  
• “Simply”	  also	  is	  used	  as	  a	  synonym	  for	  “merely,”	  e.g.	  “Considering	  the	  tens	  of	  millions	  of	  dollars	  that	  have	  been	  spent	  on	  H.	  pylori	  research	  and	  treatment	  it	  is	  amazing	  that	  not	  one	  researcher	  has	  yet	  published	  the	  clinical	  results	  in	  ulcer	  patients	  of	  simply	  eradicating	  H.	  pylori	  with	  antibiotics	  alone”	  (Graham	  1995,	  1096;	  emphasis	  added).15	  	  Similarly,	  analogy	  shows	  up	  in	  a	  scant	  three	  articles,	  and	  only	  four	  times	  total.	  However,	  a	  search	  for	  the	  synonym	  “similar”	  does	  much	  better,	  showing	  up	  in	  24	  of	  27	  articles,	  and	  is	  used	  an	  average	  of	  twice	  per	  article.	  However,	  since	  “similar”	  is	  a	  fairly	  common	  word,	  it	  is	  questionable	  just	  how	  many	  of	  these	  are	  being	  used	  as	  explanatory	  analogies,	  as	  is	  required	  by	  Thagard’s	  principle	  of	  analogy.	  This	  gains	  further	  plausibility	  when	  it’s	  noted	  that	  “differ”	  shows	  up	  twice	  as	  much	  as	  “similar,”	  but	  there	  is	  no	  theoretical	  virtue	  of	  “disanalogy.”	  Furthermore,	  Thagard	  does	  not	  include	  any	  analogies	  in	  his	  discussion	  of	  the	  bacterial	  theory	  of	  peptic	  ulcers.	  	   Might	  other	  theoretical	  virtues,	  e.g.	  Lycan’s,	  fare	  better?	  The	  results	  suggest	  otherwise.	  There	  is	  little	  textual	  evidence	  that	  scientists	  evaluate	  explanations	  in	  terms	  of	  scope,	  neatness,	  or	  fecundity.	  While	  testability	  seems	  to	  fare	  better	  than	  the	  other	  virtues,	  scientists	  frequently	  used	  the	  word	  “test”	  as	  a	  synonym	  for	  “evidence,”	  
and	  any	  account	  of	  scientific	  reasoning—explanatory	  coherentist	  or	  otherwise—will	  discuss	  evidence.	  While	  a	  search	  for	  “conservatism”	  and	  its	  cognates	  returned	  no	  results,	  “already”	  and	  “consistent	  with”	  did	  return	  some	  results.	  Examples	  of	  the	  former	  include:	  	  The	  appearance	  of	  microvilli	  as	  distinct	  from	  the	  more	  bulbous	  surface	  projections	  in	  eases	  of	  chronic	  gastritis	  has	  already	  been	  noted	  (Fung,	  Papadimitriou,	  and	  Matz	  1979,	  278;	  emphasis	  added).	  	  Examples	  of	  the	  latter	  include:	  	   …persons	  who	  immigrate	  to	  the	  United	  States	  from	  regions	  with	  a	  high	  incidence	  of	  gastric	  carcinoma	  retain	  a	  high	  risk	  for	  development	  of	  this	  malignancy,	  whereas	  subsequent	  generations	  are	  at	  lower	  risk.	  This	  trend	  is	  
consistent	  with	  the	  persistence	  of	  H.	  pylori	  infection	  in	  untreated	  persons	  (Cover	  and	  Blaser	  1992,	  138;	  emphasis	  added).	  	  	  Each	  of	  these	  passages	  refers	  to	  a	  previous	  study.	  Indeed,	  scientists’	  practice	  of	  citing	  prior	  studies	  that	  are	  consistent	  with	  their	  hypotheses	  and	  results	  is	  evidence	  that	  conservatism	  plays	  some	  role	  in	  scientific	  practice.	  	   Thus,	  we	  have	  seen	  that	  searching	  for	  keywords	  characteristic	  of	  explanatory	  coherentism	  only	  produces	  the	  rather	  unremarkable	  claim	  that	  scientists	  perform	  tests	  and	  attempt	  to	  be	  consistent	  with	  (some)	  earlier	  studies.	  This	  does	  not	  amount	  to	  a	  vindication	  of	  explanatory	  coherence.	  Furthermore,	  searches	  for	  “cohere”	  yielded	  no	  results.	  Thus,	  even	  if	  it	  could	  be	  shown	  that	  some	  of	  the	  theoretical	  virtues	  played	  a	  more	  prominent	  role,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  the	  structure	  of	  scientific	  justification	  is	  coherentist.	  	   By	  contrast,	  we	  see	  that	  statistical	  reasoning	  plays	  a	  far	  more	  pronounced	  role	  than	  the	  theoretical	  virtues.	  If	  we	  take	  “explain”	  as	  our	  baseline—which	  shows	  up	  on	  average	  about	  once	  per	  article—we	  see	  that	  the	  only	  “explanationist-­‐friendly”	  words	  that	  show	  up	  with	  greater	  frequency	  are	  “similar”	  and	  “test”.	  However,	  as	  mentioned	  above,	  “similar”	  shows	  up	  half	  as	  much	  as	  “differ”,	  and	  “test”	  does	  not	  single	  out	  explanatory	  coherentism.	  Indeed,	  three	  of	  the	  five	  phrases	  that	  show	  up	  more	  than	  twice	  per	  article	  are	  decidedly	  not	  part	  of	  the	  explanatory	  coherentist	  framework	  (in	  gray	  above).	  	  The	  preceding	  suggests	  that	  the	  most	  distinctive	  aspects	  of	  explanatory	  coherentism	  are	  largely	  idle	  in	  the	  advancement	  of	  understanding.	  Explanatory	  coherentists	  have	  two	  responses.	  First,	  they	  might	  claim	  that	  while	  scientists	  don’t	  
explicitly	  use	  simplicity	  and	  analogy,	  they	  do	  so	  implicitly.	  I	  fully	  grant	  that	  this	  is	  a	  possibility,	  but	  if	  it	  is	  to	  be	  more	  than	  idle	  speculation,	  an	  argument	  is	  needed.	  Moreover,	  it’s	  not	  enough	  to	  show	  that	  explanatory	  virtues	  could	  be	  implicit	  in	  scientific	  practice.	  Rather,	  it	  must	  be	  shown	  that	  these	  virtues	  are	  (and	  perhaps	  
must	  be)	  presupposed	  by	  scientific	  practice.	  Otherwise,	  worries	  about	  quasi-­‐coherence	  linger:	  we	  might	  just	  as	  well	  make	  do	  with	  statistical	  reasoning	  with	  nary	  
a	  concern	  about	  simplicity	  and	  the	  other	  virtues.	  To	  my	  knowledge,	  no	  arguments	  navigating	  these	  difficulties	  have	  been	  offered.	  	  Second,	  explanatory	  coherentists	  might	  grant	  that	  one	  can	  achieve	  some	  understanding	  without	  these	  explanatory	  virtues,	  while	  still	  requiring	  full	  understanding	  to	  be	  virtuous.	  However,	  this	  is	  another	  promissory	  note	  that	  must	  be	  redeemed.	  For	  instance,	  several	  authors	  deny	  that	  the	  best	  explanations	  in	  the	  special	  sciences	  ought	  to	  exhibit	  simplicity	  or	  unification—even	  in	  the	  long	  run	  (Dupré	  1993,	  2002;	  Kellert,	  Longino,	  and	  Waters	  2006;	  Mitchell	  2002;	  Wylie	  1999).	  Indeed,	  they	  argue	  that	  disunity	  is	  often	  a	  virtue.	  If	  these	  authors	  are	  correct,	  then,	  at	  best,	  simplicity	  only	  improves	  our	  understanding	  of	  some	  phenomena.	  Thus,	  if	  coherentists	  wish	  to	  defend	  the	  idea	  that	  understanding	  must	  pass	  through	  simplicity,	  analogy,	  and	  other	  theoretical	  virtues,	  they	  must	  engage	  these	  sorts	  of	  arguments.	  To	  my	  knowledge,	  these	  dialectical	  burdens	  have	  not	  been	  undertaken.	  	  Furthermore,	  a	  very	  plausible	  justification	  for	  why	  these	  virtues	  improve	  our	  understanding	  of	  only	  some	  phenomena,	  but	  not	  of	  others,	  appeals	  to	  scientific	  practice.	  For	  example,	  our	  best	  evidence	  for	  this	  “local”	  explanatory	  coherentism	  might	  be	  that	  theoretical	  physicists	  have	  successfully	  deployed	  simplicity	  as	  a	  virtue,	  but	  archaeologists	  have	  successfully	  deployed	  complexity	  as	  a	  virtue.	  However,	  this	  largely	  concedes	  that	  explanatory	  coherence	  enhances	  our	  understanding	  only	  when	  it	  promotes	  scientific	  knowledge	  of	  an	  explanation	  (in	  which	  case	  it	  is	  redundant),	  and	  should	  otherwise	  be	  abandoned	  (for	  it	  would	  then	  be	  extravagant).	  Hence,	  this	  “local”	  explanatory	  coherentism	  simply	  presupposes	  the	  very	  dilemma	  it	  is	  supposed	  to	  avoid.	  To	  summarize,	  principles	  of	  explanatory	  coherence	  fall	  into	  four	  categories.	  First,	  some	  are	  redundant	  given	  that	  SKU	  is	  already	  in	  place	  (Explanation,	  Data	  Priority,	  Contradiction,	  Competition).	  Second,	  some	  would	  only	  be	  relevant	  if	  it	  were	  already	  established	  that	  understanding	  has	  strong	  coherence	  requirements	  (Symmetry,	  Acceptance).	  Third,	  some	  do	  not	  obviously	  improve	  our	  understanding	  (Simplicity,	  Analogy,	  Scope,	  Neatness,	  Fecundity).	  Fourth,	  some	  are	  not	  distinctive	  of	  explanatory	  coherence	  (Conservatism,	  Testability).	  Thus,	  once	  we	  embrace	  SKU,	  explanatory	  coherentism	  adds	  nothing	  further	  to	  understanding.	  
4.2. BonJour	  Thagard’s	  coherentism	  is	  not	  the	  only	  way	  of	  characterizing	  understanding.	  Using	  the	  following	  criteria	  of	  coherence,	  BonJour	  (1985,	  95-­‐99)	  offers	  an	  alternative	  account	  of	  coherence:	  	   (B1) A	  system	  of	  beliefs	  is	  coherent	  only	  if	  it	  is	  logically	  consistent.	  (B2) A	  system	  of	  beliefs	  is	  coherent	  in	  proportion	  to	  its	  degree	  of	  probabilistic	  consistency.	  (B3) The	  coherence	  of	  a	  system	  of	  beliefs	  is	  increased	  by	  the	  presence	  of	  inferential	  connections	  between	  its	  component	  beliefs	  and	  increased	  in	  proportion	  to	  the	  number	  and	  strength	  of	  such	  connections.	  (B4) The	  coherence	  of	  a	  system	  of	  beliefs	  is	  diminished	  to	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  it	  is	  divided	  into	  subsystems	  of	  beliefs	  which	  are	  relatively	  unconnected	  to	  each	  other	  by	  inferential	  connections.	  
(B5) The	  coherence	  of	  a	  system	  of	  beliefs	  is	  decreased	  in	  proportion	  to	  the	  presence	  of	  unexplained	  anomalies	  in	  the	  belief	  content	  of	  the	  system.	  	  In	  principle,	  these	  five	  criteria	  could	  be	  plugged	  into	  CU	  to	  give	  it	  some	  kind	  of	  bonus	  not	  captured	  by	  SKU.	  However,	  we’ve	  seen	  that	  explanatory,	  inferential,	  and	  probabilistic	  relationships	  can	  figure	  in	  scientific	  explanatory	  evaluation,	  so	  redundancy	  looms	  large.	  	  But	  could	  some	  of	  these	  relations	  not	  figure	  in	  scientific	  practice	  in	  this	  way?	  Extravagance	  also	  threatens	  this	  Bonjourian	  account	  of	  understanding.	  Consider	  Eberhard,	  who	  has	  precisely	  the	  same	  scientific	  knowledge	  of	  ulcers	  as	  Betty.	  However,	  whereas	  both	  are	  fluent	  in	  English,	  Eberhard	  also	  knows	  German.	  Then	  only	  he	  will	  be	  able	  to	  draw	  inferences	  from	  English	  statements	  about	  ulcers	  to	  German	  statements	  about	  ulcers.	  Hence,	  by	  (B3),	  Eberhard’s	  belief	  system	  is	  more	  coherent.	  But	  since	  these	  inferential	  relations	  clearly	  play	  no	  role	  in	  scientific	  explanations	  of	  ulcers,	  Eberhard	  does	  not	  have	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  ulcers	  simply	  by	  being	  bilingual.	  Similarly,	  one	  could	  tease	  out	  trivial	  inferences,	  e.g.	  by	  using	  disjunction-­‐introduction	  (B3)	  or	  explain	  things	  completely	  unrelated	  to	  ulcers	  (B5)	  to	  increase	  coherence,	  but	  these	  surely	  will	  be	  extravagances	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  understanding	  ulcers.	  Hence,	  Bonjour’s	  coherence	  requirements	  offer	  no	  obvious	  way	  to	  steer	  clear	  of	  the	  dilemma	  between	  redundancy	  and	  extravagance.	  
4.3. Lehrer	  Finally,	  consider	  Lehrer’s	  account	  of	  coherence,	  which	  we	  can	  derive	  from	  his	  account	  of	  justification:	  	  
S	  is	  justified	  in	  accepting	  that	  p	  if	  and	  only	  if	  p	  coheres	  with	  system	  system	  X	  of	  S.	  (Lehrer	  2000,	  126)16	  
	  
S	  is	  justified	  in	  accepting	  that	  p	  if	  and	  only	  if	  everything	  that	  is	  an	  objection	  to	  
p	  for	  S	  on	  X	  is	  either	  answered	  or	  neutralized	  for	  S	  on	  X.	  (Lehrer	  2000,	  137)	  	  From	  these	  two	  claims,	  we	  get	  an	  account	  of	  coherence:	  	  	  
p	  coheres	  with	  system	  X	  of	  S	  if	  and	  only	  if	  everything	  that	  is	  an	  objection	  to	  p	  for	  S	  on	  X	  is	  either	  answered	  or	  neutralized	  for	  S	  on	  X.	  	  	  Once	  again,	  let’s	  consider	  if	  this	  can	  be	  substituted	  into	  CU	  to	  give	  coherentism	  a	  distinctive	  role	  in	  understanding	  that	  isn’t	  already	  captured	  by	  SKU.	  For	  Lehrer,	  the	  system	  X	  can	  assume	  one	  of	  two	  values,	  which	  correspond	  to	  two	  grades	  of	  justification.	  S’s	  evaluation	  system	  consists	  of	  S’s	  accepted	  propositions,	  S’s	  preferences	  to	  accept	  certain	  propositions,	  and	  S’s	  inferences.	  S’s	  
ultrasystem	  (roughly	  stated)	  is	  the	  subset	  of	  S’s	  evaluation	  system	  that	  is	  true.	  The	  two	  systems	  correspond	  to	  subjective	  or	  “personal”	  justification	  and	  a	  more	  demanding	  kind	  of	  “undefeated”	  justification,	  respectively.	  As	  it	  turns	  out,	  the	  problems	  with	  applying	  Lehrer’s	  coherentism	  to	  an	  analysis	  of	  understanding	  don’t	  hinge	  on	  this	  difference.	  
	   First,	  it	  is	  natural	  to	  think	  that	  answering	  and	  neutralizing	  objections	  to	  an	  explanation	  are	  relevant	  to	  scientific	  explanatory	  evaluation.	  However,	  §2.1	  already	  provides	  a	  more	  detailed	  account	  of	  the	  kinds	  of	  objections,	  answers,	  and	  neutralizers	  characteristic	  of	  understanding.	  In	  particular,	  alternative	  explanations	  of	  p,	  the	  disconfirmations	  thereof,	  etc.	  provide	  a	  clearer	  picture	  of	  the	  kinds	  of	  objections	  one	  must	  overcome	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  understanding.	  Thus,	  SKU	  renders	  much	  of	  Lehrer’s	  coherentism	  redundant.	  	   Furthermore,	  where	  Lehrer	  diverges	  from	  SKU,	  he	  runs	  into	  trouble.	  Consider	  how	  Lehrer	  defines	  objections,	  and	  the	  answers	  and	  neutralizers	  thereof:	  	  
o	  is	  an	  objection	  to	  p	  for	  S	  on	  system	  X	  if	  and	  only	  if	  it	  is	  less	  reasonable	  for	  S	  to	  accept	  that	  p	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  o	  is	  true	  than	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  
o	  is	  false	  based	  on	  X.	  (Lehrer	  2000,	  131)	  	  	  An	  objection	  o	  to	  p	  is	  answered	  for	  S	  on	  X	  if	  and	  only	  if	  o	  is	  an	  objection	  to	  p	  for	  S	  and	  it	  is	  more	  reasonable	  for	  S	  to	  accept	  that	  p	  than	  to	  accept	  that	  o	  on	  
X.	  (Lehrer	  2000,	  131)	  	  
n	  neutralizes	  o	  as	  an	  objection	  to	  p	  for	  S	  if	  and	  only	  if	  o	  is	  an	  objection	  to	  p	  for	  
S	  on	  X,	  but	  the	  conjunction	  of	  o	  and	  n	  is	  not	  an	  objection	  to	  p	  for	  S	  on	  X,	  and	  it	  is	  as	  reasonable	  for	  S	  to	  accept	  the	  conjunction	  of	  o	  and	  n	  as	  to	  accept	  o	  alone	  on	  X.	  (Lehrer	  2000,	  136)	  	  Clearly,	  all	  of	  these	  notions	  hinge	  on	  the	  reasonableness	  of	  accepting	  a	  proposition	  
p,	  r(p),	  which	  Lehrer	  (2000,	  146)	  defines	  as	  follows:	  	   r(p)	  =	  P(p)Ut(p)	  +	  P(~p)	  Uf(p)	  	  Here	  P(p)	  and	  P(~p)	  are	  probabilities,	  Ut(p)	  is	  the	  positive	  utility	  of	  accepting	  p	  if	  p	  is	  true,	  and	  Uf(p)	  is	  the	  negative	  utility	  of	  accepting	  p	  if	  p	  is	  false.	  Consequently,	  one’s	  preferences	  for	  seeking	  truth	  and	  avoiding	  error	  also	  figure	  in	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  belief	  coheres.	  	   However,	  this	  added	  twist	  of	  epistemic	  utilities	  is	  irrelevant	  to	  understanding.	  Specifically,	  we	  can	  always	  imagine	  someone	  who	  fully	  understands	  why	  something	  is	  the	  case	  and	  then	  imagine	  someone	  who	  is	  otherwise	  identical	  save	  for	  a	  more	  demanding	  standard	  of	  reasonableness	  owing	  to	  “perverse”	  epistemic	  utilities.	  This	  has	  untoward	  consequences	  for	  a	  theory	  of	  understanding.	  For	  instance,	  consider	  our	  heroine	  Betty,	  save	  that	  this	  time,	  she	  is	  contrasted	  with	  Fred,	  such	  that	  the	  only	  difference	  is	  that	  Fred	  assigns	  a	  pathologically	  higher	  negative	  utility	  to	  accepting	  a	  false	  explanation	  about	  the	  causes	  of	  ulcers.	  According	  to	  the	  preceding	  definitions,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  there	  is	  at	  least	  one	  objection	  to	  Fred’s	  explanation	  that	  will	  not	  be	  an	  objection	  to	  that	  same	  explanation	  on	  Betty’s	  system.	  Let	  us	  further	  assume	  that	  Fred	  cannot	  answer	  or	  neutralize	  this	  objection.	  However,	  given	  that	  her	  belief	  system	  is	  the	  same,	  Betty	  could	  not	  answer	  or	  neutralize	  these	  objections,	  either;	  the	  only	  difference	  is	  that	  this	  objection	  does	  not	  arise	  for	  her	  in	  the	  first	  place	  because	  of	  her	  more	  tempered	  
epistemic	  utilities.	  However,	  if	  we	  were	  to	  construe	  CU	  à	  la	  Lehrer,	  only	  Betty	  is	  a	  candidate	  to	  fully	  understand	  why	  some	  people	  have	  peptic	  ulcers.	  However,	  this	  is	  counterintuitive,	  for	  Betty’s	  understanding	  of	  peptic	  ulcers	  appears	  no	  different	  than	  Fred’s.	  Consequently,	  one’s	  epistemic	  utilities	  appear	  irrelevant	  to	  one’s	  understanding.	  	  
Conclusion	  To	  summarize,	  we	  began	  with	  the	  intuition	  that	  understanding	  involves	  grasping	  how	  things	  hang	  together.	  At	  first	  blush,	  coherentism	  seemed	  to	  provide	  the	  best	  explanation	  of	  that	  intuition.	  However,	  I’ve	  argued	  that	  a	  ‘science-­‐first’	  epistemology	  accounts	  for	  that	  intuition	  just	  as	  well	  as	  coherentism,	  if	  not	  better.	  In	  the	  process,	  I’ve	  shown	  that	  this	  approach	  to	  understanding	  is	  compatible	  with	  foundationalism,	  and	  that	  stronger	  brands	  of	  coherentism	  face	  many	  problems,	  by	  counseling	  us	  to	  seek	  theoretical	  virtues	  where	  none	  are	  to	  be	  had,	  to	  forge	  empty	  connections	  between	  disparate	  beliefs,	  to	  calculate	  utilities	  that	  don’t	  affect	  the	  quality	  of	  our	  understanding.	  Thus,	  the	  connection	  between	  understanding	  and	  coherence	  is	  superficial—understanding	  is	  only	  quasi-­‐coherent.	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  Here	  is	  additional	  textual	  evidence:	  “A	  tenable	  theory	  is	  a	  tapestry	  of	  interconnected	  sentences	  that	  together	  constitute	  an	  understanding	  of	  a	  domain…	  Understanding	  involves	  a	  network	  of	  commitments”	  (Elgin	  2004,	  114);	  2	  Scientific	  knowledge	  may	  be	  analyzable.	  My	  point	  is	  that	  such	  an	  analysis	  is	  unnecessary	  for	  the	  tasks	  at	  hand.	  3	  I	  would	  be	  unsurprised	  if	  some	  scientific	  methodologies	  furnish	  scientific	  knowledge	  of	  an	  explanation,	  but	  depart	  from	  this	  script.	  In	  these	  cases,	  I	  tend	  to	  defer	  to	  scientific	  practice,	  though	  with	  an	  eye	  towards	  indicating	  its	  broader	  epistemological	  import.	  Most	  importantly,	  it	  suffices	  for	  present	  purposes	  to	  show	  that	  some	  understanding	  doesn’t	  require	  coherence,	  since	  that	  means	  that	  SKU	  is	  still	  more	  fundamental	  than	  CU.	  4	  While	  this	  bears	  some	  resemblance	  to	  inference	  to	  the	  best	  explanation,	  my	  arguments	  in	  §4.1	  imply	  that	  the	  similarities	  are	  superficial.	  5	  I	  stipulate	  that	  if	  b	  confirms	  or	  is	  evidence	  for	  a,	  then	  they	  stand	  in	  one	  of	  these	  positive	  relationships.	  Parallel	  points	  apply	  to	  disconfirmation/evidence	  against	  and	  negative	  relationships.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  If	  one	  weights	  these	  relationships	  (e.g.	  by	  using	  probabilities),	  then	  we	  can	  massage	  this	  point:	  q1	  should	  not	  stand	  in	  any	  negative	  relationships	  that	  render	  it	  very	  improbable.	  This	  would	  allow	  the	  best	  explanation	  to	  tolerate,	  e.g.	  small	  anomalies.	  7	  Lehrer	  (2000)	  might	  be	  an	  exception;	  see	  4.3.	  8	  For	  a	  recent	  version	  of	  this	  debate,	  see	  the	  exchange	  between	  Elgin	  and	  Van	  Cleve	  in	  Steup,	  Turri,	  and	  Sosa	  (2013).	  9	  I	  don’t	  discuss	  probabilistic	  accounts	  of	  coherence,	  though	  Gijsbers	  (2015)	  	  poses	  some	  nice	  challenges	  to	  those	  who	  would	  use	  probabilistic	  coherence	  measures	  in	  the	  context	  of	  understanding.	  10	  In	  order	  to	  discriminate	  explanantia	  from	  explananda,	  Thagard	  (1992)	  implements	  explanatory	  coherence	  in	  a	  computer	  program	  that	  represents	  explanatory	  information	  as	  an	  ordered	  pair.	  11	  Thagard	  claims	  that	  some	  epidemiologists	  not	  working	  on	  ulcers	  invoke	  coherence	  as	  a	  criterion	  of	  explanatory	  evaluation	  (e.g.,	  Susser	  1973).	  However,	  there	  is	  no	  citation	  evidence	  that	  these	  epidemiologists	  influenced	  the	  ulcer	  researchers	  whom	  Thagard	  studied.	  12	  I	  did	  not	  restrict	  any	  of	  my	  searches	  to	  whole	  words	  only;	  nor	  were	  my	  searches	  case-­‐sensitive.	  I	  examined	  each	  hit	  in	  the	  search	  to	  check	  for	  spuriousness.	  For	  example,	  while	  a	  search	  for	  “test”	  should	  not	  be	  limited	  to	  a	  whole	  word	  search,	  since	  that	  would	  omit	  “tests,”	  “testing,”	  etc.	  I	  had	  to	  omit	  words	  such	  as	  “intestine.”	  13	  I	  also	  did	  searches	  where	  there	  was	  no	  space	  between	  ‘p’	  and	  the	  equality/inequality	  sign.	  14	  See	  also	  Olbe	  et	  al.	  (1996,	  1394).	  15	  See	  also	  Graham	  and	  Go	  (1993,	  281).	  16	  This	  account	  of	  coherence	  is	  entailed	  by	  Lehrer’s	  definition	  of	  justification	  in	  terms	  of	  coherence	  Lehrer	  adds	  a	  time	  variable	  t	  that	  I	  omit	  throughout	  this	  discussion.	  
